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EQUAL RIGHTS TO TRIAL FOR WOMEN: SEX BIAS IN
THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE
Elizabeth M. Schneider*
Self-defense claims by battered women charged with homicide
have attracted national attention.' Much of the resulting literature
ignores the sex bias these women face in court and views their asser-
tions of self-defense as requests for special treatment.2 The assertions
are, however, pleas for equal treatment. This Article examines how
sexual stereotypes of women and the male orientation built into the
law prevent judges and jurors from appreciating the circumstances of
battered women's acts of self-defense and their perceptions.
*B.A. Bryn Mawr College, 1968; M. Sc. London School of Economics and
Political Science, 1969; J.D. New York University Law School, 1973; Staff attorney,
Constitutional Litigation Clinic, Rutgers Law School-Newark. The author worked
with the Women's Self-Defense Law Project on problems of sex discrimination faced
by women who defended themselves against physical or sexual assault. She was also
one of appellate counsel in State v. Wanrow, discussed in this Article.
The author thanks Elizabeth Bochnak, Jonathan Hyman, Holly Skolnick,
Susan Sternberg, Nadine Taub, the Women's Self-Defense Law Project and the attor-
neys who cooperated with the Project for their assistance in the preparation of this
article.
I Meyers, Battered Wives, Dead Husbands, STUDENT LAW. March, 1978, at 46;
Quindlen, Women Who Kill Their Spouses: The Causes, the Legal Defenses, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 10, 1978, § B, at 4, col. I [hereinafter cited as Quindlen]; Rensberg, The
Case of Patricia Gross, FAm. CIRCLE, Apr. 24, 1979, at 58; The Right to Kill,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 1975, at 69; Wives Who Batter Back, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 30,
1978, at 54; Right of Women to Self-Defense Gaining in "Battered Wife" Cases, N.Y.
Times, May 7, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1; A Killing Excuse, TIME, Nov. 28, 1977, at 108;
Battered Wives and Self-Defense, Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 1977, § A, at 1, col. 2.
2 See Quindlen, supra note 1 (Wisconsin attorney believes that the battered wife
syndrome defense is "the wave of The future"). See also Note, The Battered Wife
Syndrome: A Potential Defense to a Homicide Charge, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 213,
226 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Battered Wife Syndrome]; Comment, Bat-
tered Wives Who Kill: Double Standard Out of Court, Single Standard In?, 2 LAw &
HuMAN BEHAVIOR 133, 141 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Battered Wives
Who Kill]. Recognition of the battered-woman status has been seen by some as
sex-discriminatory. Casenote, Does Wife Abuse Justify Homicide?, 24 WAYNE L.
RFv. 1705, 1726 n. 164 [hereinafter cited as Casenote, Does Wife Abuse Justify Hom-
icideS.
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This Article develops a theory of sex bias for application in a
homicide case involving a woman defendant, typically the victim of
battering by a husband or lover.' Section I analyzes how social stereo-
types of women affect the attitudes of triers of fact. Section II exam-
ines prejudices that, built into the law, restrict a woman's claim of
self-defense. Section III argues that the law of self-defense should be
applied in a sex-neutral, individualized manner that will lead to equal
treatment of all defendants claiming self-defense.
I. MYTHS ABOUT BATTERED WOMEN
A. Social Attitudes toward Battered Women
Woman abuse4 has recently been recognized as a serious prob-
lem.' It is estimated that one-third to one-half of all women who live
Most persons killed by women were men with whom the women had had rela-
tionships "within the context of the family"; the killings were "often in self-defense
or in a victim-precipitated interaction." C. SMART, WOMEN, CRIME AND CRIMINOL-
OGay 17 (1976). See M. WOLFGANG, PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 217 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as M. WOLFGANG]; Pokorny, Human Violence: A Comparison of
Homicide, Aggravated Assault, Suicide, and Attempted Suicide, 6 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 488, 496-97 (1965); Ward, Jackson & Ward, Crimes of Violence by Women, in
CRIMES OF VIOLENCE 117, 867 (D. Mulrihill, M. Tumin & L. Curtis eds. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as Ward, Jackson & Ward]; Wolfgang, Victim-Precipitated Crimi-
nal Homicide, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 569, 574-75 (2d ed.
M. Wolfgang, L. Savitz & N. Johnston eds. 1970). One study claimed that male hom-
icide victims contribute to their deaths in approximately 94% of the cases. D.
LUNDE, MURDER AND MADNESS 10 (1975).
1 One author suggests that
[t]he naming of the problem [of men beating women] . . reflects one's
view of the causes of the problem, and it restricts one's perception of the
nature of the problem. None of the terms currently used to name the prob-
lem are satisfactory. The violence is not confined to acts by husbands
against wives. Women who are not married may also be subjected to vio-
lence by the men in their lives so terms like wife-abuse and wife-assault are
under-inclusive. The terms woman-abuse, woman-assault and
woman-battering all focus on the woman and ignore the man, who is, after
all, the problem.
Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 5 WOMEN'S RIGrTS L. REp. 7, 8
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Woods].
I See generally, R. DOBASH & R. DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES (1979); R.
GELLES, THE VIOLENT HOME (1972) [hereinafter cited as R. GELLES]; R. LANGLEY &
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with male companions experience such forms of brutality as threats of
severe harm, degradation, beatings or torture. 6 This abuse may result
in mental health problems, broken bones, disfigurement, miscarriage
or death.7 Yet women who commit homicide in defending themselves
against such brutality are seldom understood. Many people mistakenly
believe that the police provide adequate protection for women who are
battered, that battered women voluntarily participate in and enjoy bat-
tering relationships, or that the beatings suffered by these women are
justified by their behavior.8
R. LEVY, WIFE BEATING (1977) [hereinafter cited as R. LANGLEY & R. LEvY]; D.
MARTIN, BATTERED WrvEs (1976) [hereinafter cited as D. MARTIN]; E. PIZZEY,
SCREAM QUIETLY OR THE NEIGHBORS WILL HEAR (1974) [hereinafter cited as E. PIz-
ZEY]; S. STEINMETZ, THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE (1977); U.S. COMM'N ON CrVIL
RIGHTS, BATTERED WOMEN (1978) [hereinafter cited as U.S. COMM'N]; VIOLENCE IN
THE FAMILY (S. Steinmetz & M. Straus eds. 1974); L. WALKER, BATTERED WOMEN
AND LEARNED HELPLESSNESS (1979) [hereinafter cited as L. WALKER]; Barden, Wife
Beaters: Few of Them Ever Appear Before a Court of Law, N.Y Times, Oct. 21,
1974, § 2, at 38, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Barden]; Durbin, Wife-Beating, LADIEs
HOME J., June, 1974, at 62 [hereinafter cited as Durbin]; Eisenberg & Michlow, The
Assaulted Wife: "Catch-22" Revisited, 3 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 138 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Eisenberg & Michlow]; Straus, Wife-Beating: How Common
and Why?, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 443 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Straus]; Woods, supra
note 4, at 8.
6 See generally R. LANGLEY & R. LEvY, supra note 5. One out of two American
married women may become a victim of her husband's violence, Langley and Levy
have contended, id. at 12, but the beatings may go seriously underreported, Durbin,
supra note 5, at 64; Guthrie, The Battered Wife: A Victim of Most Underreported
Crime, Cleveland Press, Nov. 3, 1976, § C, at 4, col. 3; Martin, Overview-Scope of
the Problem, in U.S. COMM'N, supra note 5, at 207; Schulman, Poor Women and
Family Law, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1069, 1070n.14 (1981); Woods, supra note 4,
at 8n.9.
The abuse is equally pervasive in all classes and races. M. BARD, THE STUDY
AND MODIFICATION OF INTRA-FAMILIAL VIOLENCE 154 (1971); Martin,
Overview-Scope of the Problem, in U.S. COMM'N, supra note 5, at 207. In fact, a
1968 Harris poll concluded that marital violence is more accepted by the highly edu-
cated than by the uneducated. Start & McEnvoy, Middle Class Violence, PSYCH.
TODAY, November, 1970, at 31-32.
1 See generally R. LANGLEY & R. LEvY, supra note 5; D. MARTIN, supra note 5,
at 10-24; Steinmetz, Wifebeating, Husbandbeating-A Comparison of the Use of
Physical Violence Between Spouses to Resolve Marital Fights, in BATTERED WOMEN
63 (M. Roy ed. 1977).
8 See generally M. PAGELOW, BLAMING THE VICTIM (19??).
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In fact, the law enforcement system fails to protect women from
abuse.9 The police often fail to respond to domestic disturbance calls.'°
When they do respond, arrest is unlikely; " police policy and training
manuals stress mediation of domestic disputes rather than arrest. 2
One study reports that in 85 percent of domestic violence cases, the
police had been summoned at least once within the two-year period
before the homicide occurred.' 3 The dead person was usually the
woman. Forty-one percent of all women killed are killed by their hus-
bands." The reluctance of law enforcement officers to intervene and
arrest has led a police commander in Detroit to acknowledge: "You
can readily understand . . . why the women ultimately take the law
into their own hands or despair of finding relief at all."'5
Women derive no pleasure from battering relationships, but they
are unable to see any alternative to continuing, often escalating,
violence.' 6A woman who leaves her husband may be without employ-
ment, child care or adequate housing. There are few shelters for her.'
7
9 D. MARTIN, supra note 5, at 87-118; Barden, supra note 5, at 38; Eisenberg,
An Overview of Legal Remedies for Battered Women-Part , TRIAL, August, 1979,
at 28; Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 5, at 159; Fields, Representing Battered
Wives, or What to do until the Police Arrive, [1977] 3 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4025,
4027-28 [hereinafter cited as Fields]; Truninger, Marital Violence: The Legal Solu-
tions, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 259, 262 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Truninger]; Woods,
supra note 5, at 9-11.
10 Woods, supra note 5, at 9-11.
I Fields, supra note 9, at 4027; Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 5, at 156-57;
Woods, supra note 5, at 10-11.
12 Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 5, at 156-57; Truninger, supra note 9, at
272; Woods, supra note 5, at 9-10.
" POLICE FOUNDATION, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE 10-18 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as POLICE FOUNDATION]. In 50% of the cases the police had been
called at least five times within a two-year period before the killing. Id.
" Wolfgang, A Sociological Analysis of Criminal Homicide, in STUDIES IN
HOMICIDE 15, 23 (M. Wolfgang ed. 1967).
11 D. MARTIN, supra note 5, at 114.
16 Id. at 83-86; Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 5, at 145; Straus, supra note
5, at 449; Note, The Casefor Legal Remediesfor Abused Women, 6 N.Y.U. R~v. OF
L. AND SOC. CHANGE 135, 140 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, LegalRemedies].
" PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL POPU-
LATIONS SUBPANEL ON MENTAL HEALTH OF WOMEN (1978) [hereinafter cited as MEN-
TAL HEALTH]. Shelters serve a critical function in providing a temporary safe home
for women, but they are only a short-term alternative to a violent home. The Presi-
[Vol. 15
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The woman often must leave young children behind or uproot her
children and separate them from their father, friends and school. The
extreme isolation the typical battered woman feels is the result of her
shame and her efforts to hide her situation, her husband's active
attempts to separate her from friends and relatives and the unwilling-
ness of friends and relatives to intervene. The isolation strengthens her
belief that she has no alternative to remaining with the violent man.II
If she manages to leave, her husband may follow her, even across state
lines, and force her to return.' 9
Her lack of alternatives leads the battered woman to cling to the
illusion that her man will change. Her illusion is often reinforced by
the man's promises to reform.2" When the violence recurs and esca-
lates, the battered woman realizes she lacks control over the situa-
tion.2 ' She lives with "learned helplessness,"" expecting more severe
and increasingly unpredictable beatings.3
The assumption that battered women deserve their beatings has a
historical background that will be discussed in the following section.
B. The Legal Origins of Woman Abuse
Women have historically been viewed as male property.2 At early
common law women had no autonomous existence. It was and still is
assumed that women have men to protect them and need not be able
dent's Commission on Mental Health Problems of Women has recommended the
establishment of a nationwide network of shelters to protect abused women who are
forced to flee one city after another. Id. at 327. But as Judge Lisa Richette of Phila-
delphia said at the United States Civil Rights Commission Hearings on Domestic Vio-
lence in January, 1978, "all the shelters in the world would not provide support for
women unless all society is reorganized to end sexism" 46 U.S.L.W. 2421 (1978).
,S Hilberman & Munson, Sixty Battered Women, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 460, 462
(1977-78) [hereinafter cited as Hilberman & Munson].
" MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 17, at 327 (1978). The violent attacks usually
take place in the home; the wife who flees the attack may have to leave young chil-
dren behind, possibly endangering later custody claims. Fields, supra note 9, at 4026.
20 L. WALKER, supra note 5, at 532.
21 R. LANGLEY & R. Lnvy, supra note 5, at 114-25; D. MARTIN, supra note 5, at
72-86; POLICE FOUNDATION, supra note 13, at 10-11.
2 L. WALKER, supra note 5, at'532.
21 E. PIZZEY, supra note 5, at 41.
24 WOMEN AND THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT 241 (C. Stimpson ed. 1972).
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to defend themselves. "Healthy" women are expected to be depen-
dent, passive and submissive; "healthy" men are encouraged to be
aggressive, competitive and dominant.25 Women are discouraged from
learning how to defend themselves because such behavior is "unfemi-
nine;" 26 they are also taught to avoid engaging in violence.27 As a
result, when placed in a situation in which self-preservation requires
physical violence, women suffer a great deal of anxiety.28
The historic sanction of woman abuse within marriage derives
from the husband's ownership of his wife and his right to chastise
her.2 Anglo-American law treats a husband's assault upon his wife as
an "acceptable practice."3 Woman abuse results from a patriarchal
legacy that allots a dominant role to husbands and a submissive role to
wives. Accordingly, wives have been called the appropriate victims of
violence.'
In sharp contrast to the sanction accorded woman abuse within
marriage, husband killing has historically been viewed as a crime
against the state-a form of treason.32 Blackstone explained that since
the husband was lord of his wife, her killing him was treachery analo-
11 Broverman, Broverman, Clarkson, Rosencrantz & Vogel, Sex-Role Stereo-
types and Clinical Judgments of Mental Health, 34 J. OF CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCH. 1, 4-5 (1970).
26 Id. See generally B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 990-1036 (1975); Bardwick, Ambivalence: The
Socialization of Women, in READINGS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 52-58 (J.
Bardwick ed. 1972); Hoffman-Bustamente, The Nature of Female Criminality, 8
IssuEs IN CRIMINOLOGY 117, 123 (1973).
" P. CHESLER, WOMEN AND MADNESS 294 (1972) [hereinafter cited as P.
CHESLER].
"' Consentino & Heilbrun, Anxiety Correlates of Sex-Role Identity in College
Students, in READINGS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 59-65 (J. Bardwick ed.
1972).
,9 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (R. Welsh &
Co. ed. 1897) [hereinafter cited as W. BLACKSTONE].
11 "For too long, Anglo-American law treated a man's physical abuse of his wife
as different from any other assault and, indeed, as an acceptable practice." Bruno v.
Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 1048, 396 N.YS.2d 974, 975 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd in part,
appeal dismissed in part, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y2d
582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.YS.2d 901 (1979).
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gous to murdering the king.33 Husband killing struck at the root of all
civil government.3" This is not surprising. If the exercise of merely
defensive force by women challenges traditional views of appropriate
female conduct, the use of deadly force by a woman against a man
who has abused her must contradict social stereotypes and threaten a
basic conception of traditional society."
Social misconceptions of battered women often blind the trier of
fact to the reasonableness of a battered woman's use of defensive
force. Since the law has historically permitted woman abuse, judges
and jurors do not see it as serious or life threatening. A history of beat-
ings may further reduce her chances of success. Even if judges and
jurors accept the severity of the abuse, they assume she deserved the
brutality and fault her for not ending the relationship.36 A counselor
who works with battered women and who has spoken frequently on
their problems has said:
Even today most people are still asking the question, "Why
do they stay"? Very often I hear the view that if she didn't
like it she would get out of the situation. Also people say
that the [women] must like it and if they do leave the guy,
they will just go to another guy who will do the same thing.
3' 4 W BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at 1602.
3 Husband and wife, in the language of the law, are styled baron and
feme. The word baron, or lord, attributes to the husband not a very
courteous superiority. But we might be inclined to think this merely an
unmeaning technical phrase, if we did not recollect that if the baron kills
his feme it is the same as if he had killed a stranger, or any other person;
but if the feme kills her baron, it is regarded by the laws as a much more
atrocious crime, as she not only breaks through the restraints of human-
ity and conjugal affection, but throws off all subjection to the authority
of her husband. And therefore the law denominates her crime a species
of treason, and condemns her to the same punishment as if she had
killed the king. And for every species of treason . the sentence of
women was to be drawn and burnt alive.
1W BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at 418 n.103. See also H. RANKIN, CruNAL TRIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE GENERAL COURT OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 224 (1965).
11 See text accompanying note 39 infra.
36 W RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM 1-11 (rev. ed. 1976).
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It is common for people to hold the attitude that the woman
probably asks for it and deserves it."
When a woman charged with homicide explains her use of force
as a reasonable and necessary response to abuse in the home, jurors
are threatened more deeply than in the case of a male defendant who
claims to have killed in self-defense. In State v. Brinker,38 an affidavit
submitted to the court in support of jury questioning and expert testi-
mony explained that juror denial of the problem of woman abuse is
common because denial "allows a person to continue to hold on to the
image of the family as an institution of love, nourishment, and protec-
tion.""
Given such attitudes, it is not surprising that insanity has been the
traditional defense of women who have killed their husbands. 0
II. THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE
Self-defense, the most broadly recognized defense to an inten-
tional homicide, rests on the view that a person may take reasonable
steps to defend himself or herself from physical harm.' A defendant
who claims self-defense asks the trier of fact to find that a homicide
was justified." Justified behavior is correct and appropriate, 3 not
11 Affidavit of Virginia Jacobson in support of motion for jury questioning and
expert testimony, State v. Brinker, No. 30842 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 3, 1978).
" No. 30842 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 3, 1978).
19 Affidavit of Pat Murphy in support of motion for jury questioning and
expert testimony, State v. Brinker, No. 30842 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 3, 1978).
40 See note 78 and accompanying text infra.
W. LAFAvE & A. SCoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 371 (1972) [hereinaf-
ter cited as W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT]; R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 93-94 (2d ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as R. PERKINS].
42 Some commentators have analyzed self-defense as containing aspects of both
justification and excuse. G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRImNAL LAW 855 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as 0. FLETCHER]; Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal
Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 U. CAL. L.A. L. REV. 266, 275
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Robinson]. At common law the difference between justifi-
able and excusable homicide was the difference between a killing for which one had
to be acquitted and a killing for which one could be convicted and pardoned. R.
PERKINS, supra note 41, at 1001.
'1 0. FLETCHER, supra note 42, at 855; Note, Justification: The Impact of the
Model Penal Code on Statutory Reform, 75 CoLuM. L. REv. 914, 916 (1975).
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only tolerated by the law but encouraged." Inquiries about justifica-
tion focus on the act rather than on the actor. A finding of justifica-
tion is a finding that the act was right because of the circumstances of
the act. By contrast, an excusable act is one that, although wrong,
should be tolerated because of the actor's characteristics. 5 The actor
claiming excuse says, "I didn't mean to do it" or "I couldn't help
myself;" the focus of excuse is on the actor's inability to avoid commit-
ting the offense."6
An act committed in self-defense was justified given the individ-
ual actor. The trier of fact must understand the circumstances of the
act and identify with the actor. In examining the circumstances of the
act, the fact finder applies substantive rules that reflect a standard of
reasonableness. If the circumstances of the act claimed to be in
self-defense do not justify the act, the jury shifts its focus to excuse
and examines the defendant's mental or emotional state. The law looks
at excuses only after justification fails. 7
A. Legal Rules Governing Reasonableness
A number of legal rules have been developed to determine the
reasonableness of self-defense claims. A person has the right to use
deadly force in self-defense when he or she has been attacked with
deadly force48 and is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
harm.4 9
1. Equal Force Rule
Under the equal force rule, deadly force may be used only to
repel deadly force.s The rule rests on the assumption of two adver-
" Robinson, supra note 42, at 274.
, G. FLETCHER, supra note 42, at 857; Robinson, supra note 42, at 274.
46 Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L. REv.
1269, 1269-71 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fletcher, Individualization].
17 Robinson, supra note 42, at 275.
41 W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 41, at 393. The use of a deadly weapon
against an unarmed person may be sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that
the defendant acted with malice. King v. State, 249 Ind. 699, 234 N.E.2d 465 (1968).
19 W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 41, at 394. "The word imminent means
. . . threatening to occur immediately, near at hand, impending!' State v. Huett, 340
Mo. 934, 950, 104 S.W. 2d 252, 262 (1937).
1o W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 41, at 293.
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saries equal in size, strength and physical training. However, few
women have the size or strength of a male assailant or the training in
physical combat necessary to protect themselves. 5' In addition,
women, socialized not to use physical force, are reluctant to defend
themselves without weapons." A battered woman's past efforts to
defend herself with only her own strength may have reinforced this
view since her efforts probably triggered increased violence against
her." As a result, women usually commit homicide with guns, knives
or household implements instead of by physical force alone." The
woman believes, usually correctly, that her husband is capable of
severely injuring or killing her without a weapon. In many cases, the
woman arms herself" intending to ward off an attack by only threat-
ening to use the weapon, but either because of lack of familiarity with
the weapon 6 or because frightened by a sudden move by the man,"
she shoots or stabs him.
11 See generally Hoffman-Bustamente, supra note 26, at 123.
52 Id.
11 Note, Legal Remedies, supra note 16, at 135 n.1 (1977); PoLicE FouNDA-
TION, supra note 13, at 9. See also People v. Giacalone, 242 Mich. 16, 217 N.W. 758
(1928); questionnaire concerning People v. Powell, No. 78-63 (Tompkins County
Ct., N.Y. Mar. 22, 1979) (on file with the Women's Self-Defense Law Project).
" Ward, Jackson & Ward, supra note 3, at 867, 871. Moreover, 67% of women
who committed homicide were deemed to have committed nonviolent homicide,
defined as involving a single stab wound, blow or gunshot. M. WOLFGA G, supra
note 3, at 85, 160. Violent men tended to hit, push or struggle, while women were
likely to pick up hard objects within reach or use weapons such as knives. R. GiELLES,
supra note 5, at 73, 80.
11 Questionnaires filed with the Women's Self-Defense Law Project concerning
State v. Hutchinson, No. 78-693-CF-A-01 (Marion County Cir. Ct., Fla. Mar. 27,
1979); State v. Childers, No. S 78-69 (Enton Cir. Ct., Ind. Dec. 14, 1978); Common-
wealth v. Tallini, Crim. No. 78-5722 (Middlesex Country Super. Ct., Mass. Mar. 30,
1979); State v. Gibbs, No. 969-77 (Middlesex County Ct., N.J. May 17, 1979); State
v. Phillips, No. 78 CrS 104018 (Mecklenburg County Super. Ct., N.C. Mar. 8, 1979).
56 Questionnaires filed with the Women's Self-Defense Law Project concerning
State v. Childers, No. S 78-69 (Enton Cir. Ct., Ind. Dec. 14, 1979); Commonwealth
v. Tallini, Crim. No. 78-5722 (Middlesex County Super. Ct., Mass. Mar. 30, 1979);
State v. Hornbuckle, No. 9401 (Whatcom County Super. Ct., Wash. Mar. 10, 1977).
11 Questionnaires filed with the Women's Self-Defense Law Project concerning
State v. Hutchinson, No. 78-693-CF-A-01 (Marion County Cir. Ct., Fla. Mar. 27,
1979); State v. Gibbs, No. 969-77 (Middlesex County Ct., N.J. May 17, 1979); State
v. Phillips, No. 78 CrS 104018 (Mecklenburg County Super. Ct., N.C. Mar. 8, 1979);
State v. Thomas, No. 37171 (Cuyahoga County Ct. of C.P., Ohio June 20, 1978).
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The deadly force rule is particularly troublesome for a battered
woman. Although she may have no alternative but to defend herself
with a weapon, the traditional interpretation of the deadly force rule
can render her use of a deadly weapon unreasonable. The application
of the rule has kept the woman's claim of self-defense from being
properly submitted to the jury or has restricted jury consideration of
the claim. 8
Instructions on the reasonableness of force allowed cap. be highly
prejudicial. Jury instructions about self-defense normally state that
deadly force is only appropriate when the defendant reasonably
believes she is threatened with death or great bodily harm. 9 Great
bodily harm is usually defined as "an injury of a graver and more seri-
ous nature than an ordinary hitting or striking with the fists or
hands."'6 But the ordinary injury suffered by a man in a fist fight with
another man is different from the ordinary injury suffered by a
woman being abused by a man. An instruction telling the jury that
"ordinary hitting or striking with fist or hands" is not enough to cause
great bodily injury restricts a woman's claim of self-defense. 6'
In most jurisdictions, a woman threatened in her own home with
great bodily harm need not retreat before using deadly force against a
cooccupant.62 A duty to retreat would require her to abandon her chil-
dren to a man in a violent rage.
58 Easterling v. State, 267 P2d 185 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954) (conviction
reversed because trial court erroneously instructed jury to apply the equal force
requirement); Kress v. State, 176 Tenn. 478, 144 S.W2d 735 (1940) (trial court erred
in not instructing jury that woman could use deadly weapon against her assailant).
But see People v. Davis, 33 Ill. App. 3d 105, 337 N.E.2d 256 (1975) (affirmed trial
court's finding that defendant did not act in self-defense because "a belief that the
decedent unarmed might kill or greatly injure the defendant while she had a loaded
gun was unreasonable").
"9 See, e.g., CALJIC No. 5.12 (1979); Minn. CRIMJIG No. 7.05 (1977); North
Carolina Pattern Jury Instruction-Crim. 308.10 (1975); WISJI Criminal 805 (1971).
60 Supplemental Brief for Appellant at Appendix A (Court's Instructions to the
Jury-Instruction 20Vz), State v. Crigler, 23 Wash. App. 716, 598 P.2d 739 (1979).
6 Most jurisdictions do not allow the use of deadly force to prevent assault and
battery when there is no threat of serious bodily harm. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 464 (1974); HAwAn REv. STAT. § 703-304 (1976).
62 W LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 41, at 396. The present majority rule
allows a defender to stand his or her ground and use deadly force, but a substantial
minority of jurisdictions allow deadly defensive force only if the defender cannot
safely retreat. Note, Limits on the Use of Defensive Force to Prevent Intramarital
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2. Imminent Danger Rule
The imminent danger rule presupposes a one-time adversarial
encounter, As such, it focuses on the circumstances immediately
before the incident and does not take into account harm threatened in
the past or future.63
This focus puts women defendants at a disadvantage. Homicides
committed by battered women frequently occur with a time lag, while
the man is asleep or while his back is turned." Typically, the man beats
the woman, sometimes threatening to kill her, until he passes out or
falls asleep. Fearing that when he awakes he will beat her more
severely or act on his threat, she attacks him while he sleeps.
Battered women usually believe that the incident that resulted in
their homicide was more severe or life-threatening than prior inci-
dents.6" Studies suggest that battered women have learned to be atten-
tive to signs of escalating violence and to modify their behavior in
response to these danger signals in order to pacify violent husbands. 66
Subtle motions or threats that might not signify danger to an outsider
or to the trier of fact acquire added meaning for a battered woman
whose survival depends on an intimate knowledge of her assailant.
When the imminent danger rule is interpreted to preclude admission of
evidence of the prior relationship and the abuse a woman has suffered,
Assaults, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 643, 654 (1979). Most of the minority jurisdictions do
not require the assailed to retreat from his or her own home, e.g., People v.
McGrandy, 9 Mich. App. 187, 190-91, 156 N.W2d 48, 49-50 (1967), even when the
defender is attacked by a cooccupant. Note, Limits on the Use of Defensive Force,
supra, at 655. For descriptions of marital assaults within the family dwelling, see,
e.g., Hutchinson v. State, 180 Ala. 27, 54 So. 119 (1910); State v. Leeper, 199 Iowa
432, 200 N.E. 732 (1924); People v. Lentzevich, 394 Mich. 117, 220 N.W2d 298
(1975); People v. Stallworth, 364 Mich. 528, 111 N.W2d 742 (1961); State v. Gran-
tham, 224 S.C. 41, 77 S.E. 291 (1953).
61 See, e.g., State v. Trombino, 352 So. 2d 682 (La. 1977); State v. McMillian,
223 La. 96, 64 So. 2d 856 (1953); People v. Giacalone, 242 Mich. 16, 217 N.W. 738
(1902); Wallace v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. 300, 70 S.W. 756 (1902). See also Beale,
Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARv. L. REv. 567 (1903).
64 Hoffman-Bustamente, supra note 26, at 123; Ward, Jackson & Ward, supra
note 3, at 119; Comment, Battered Wives Who Kill, supra note 2, at 160.
65 J. TOTMAN, THE MURDEREss 46-47 (1978).
66 Hilberman & Munson, supra note 18, at 467.
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the jury is unable to understand why the woman believed herself to be
in danger.67
B. The Reasonable Man Standard
Social mores determine when self-defense is reasonable. 6 Defen-
sive force is generally tolerated when honor, property or family must
be protected. 69 It is usually considered appropriate to engage in
self-defense during fistfights or barroom brawls. Because these are not
the situations in which women are likely to exert self-defense, the rea-
sonableness of a woman's act may be difficult to establish in court.
Widespread adherence to the sex-biased "reasonable man" standard
compounds women's problems: "in all that mass of authorities which
bears upon this branch of the law [the reasonableness standard], there
is no single mention of the reasonable woman."70
67 Some courts have so held. See People v. Moore, 43 Cal. 2d 517, 275 P.2d 485
(1954); People v. Bush, 84 Cal. App. 3d 294, 148 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1978); People v.
Torres, 94 Cal. App. 2d 146, 210 P.2d 329 (1949).
61 G. FLETCHER, supra note 42, at 242-56, 855-70.
69 Thus, a self-defense claim was often deemed appropriate when a man found
his wife with her paramour and killed the paramour. See, e.g., Blackerby v. Com-
monwealth, 200 Ky. 832, 255 S.W. 824 (1923); State v. Kidd, 24 N.M. 572, 175 P. 772
(1917); Pickett v. State, 40 Okla. Crim. 289, 268 P 732 (1928). A special statutory
justification defense existed in some states for the paramour situation. See "The
Unwritten Law as a Defense," 1963 N.M. Laws ch. 303, § 2-4 (repealed 1973);
"Adultery as Justification," TEx. PEN. CODE art. 1220 (1925) (repealed 1973).
Adultery committed by a woman has also been recognized as a separate cate-
gory of legally sufficient provocation when asserted by a man. See, e.g., State v.
Will, 18 N.C. 121, 169 (1889) ("of all the provocations which can excite a man to
madness, the law recognizes it as the highest and strongest"). See generally Note,
Manslaughter and the Adequacy of Provocation: The Reasonableness of the Reason-
able Man, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 1021, 1023 (1958).
The law has also recognized a special "honor" defense that took the technical
form of an insanity defense. The defense allowed admission of evidence of "all the
prior relationships between the adulterer and the accused's wife to show [the
accused's] state of mind" but led to complete acquittal, not commitment. See gener-
ally Roberts, The Unwritten Law, 10 Ky. L.J. 45 (1922); Comment, Recognition of
the Honor Defense Under the Insanity Plea, 43 YALE L.J. 809 (1934).
70 A. HERBERT, MISLEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 18 (1930).
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Being female renders a successful self-defense claim unlikely.
Female traits have been viewed as the antithesis of reasonableness;"
women were considered incapable of meeting the standard required of
a reasonable man.72 Rationality has been considered a male character-
istic; women have been viewed as "disabled" by their lack of logic."
This sex stereotype and the atypical self-defense settings in which
women act have made it difficult for them to appear reasonable and
demonstrate the reasonableness of their acts.7
C. The Impact of Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense
Sex bias in the law of self-defense has two effects. First,
sex-stereotyped attitudes and the sex bias inherent in the legal rules of
self-defense often cause the judge to exclude evidence of an individual
woman's circumstances and perceptions. The woman is thus unable to
present her case fully and is denied a fair trial. Second, sex-stereotyped
attitudes make it more likely that the trier of fact will excuse the
woman on grounds of incapacity rather than declare her act of
self-defense justified.
1. Exclusion of Evidence
Using the equal force and imminent danger rules, trial courts
have excluded or limited evidence proving grave danger to the woman
I Collins, Language, History and the Legal Process: A Profile of the Reason-
able Man, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 311, 323 (1977).
I d. at 315-20.
" This association is reflected in the law. Legal textbooks still consider prob-
lems relating to women in the sections devoted to idiots and lunatics. See T. ATKIN-
SON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 238-42 (1953); S. BAILEY, THE LAW OF WLLS
74-77; T. CHESIRE & C. FrooT, Tim LAW OF CONTRACTS 394-97 (1969).
The device of the equitable trust was developed as a remedy to protect married
women's property rights although "until its application to married women, it had
been associated with the protection of infants and idiots:' Being a woman has effec-
tively meant being viewed by the law as functioning with an "impaired mental state:'
L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW 39-40 (1969).
"' See generally Johnston & Knapp, Sex-Discrimination by Law: A Study in
Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 674 (1972); Mahoney, Sexism in Voir Dire:
The Use of Sex Stereotypes in Jury Selection, in WoMEN N THE CouRTs 114 (W.
Hepperle and L. Crites eds. 1978); Nagel & Wetizman, Women as Litigants, 28 HAsT-
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defendant, including evidence of past abuses suffered by her and
threats made to her.15 Moreover, evidence of her assailant's reputation
for violence has been excluded or limited.76 The woman is denied equal
protection of the laws when the sex bias of such rules burdens the pre-
sentation of her case." She is denied a fair trial when she cannot put
before the jury all the relevant facts,"8 and the jury is unable to fulfill
IWas L.J. 171 (1971); Soler, A Womans Place... Combatting Sex Based Prejudices
in Jury Trials Through Voir Dire, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 535, 538 (1978).
11 For cases in which the appellate courts reversed trial courts' exclusion of evi-
dence of past abuse or threats, see State v. McMillian, 223 La. 96, 64 So. 2d 15
(1953); People v. Stallworth, 364 Mich. 528, 111 N.W.2d 742 (1961); People v. Giaca-
lone, 242 Mich. 16, 217 N.W. 738 (1928); Wallace v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. 300, 70 S.E.
756 (1902); State v. Crigler, 23 Wash. App. 716, 598 P.2d 739 (1979).
In People v. Reeves, 47 Ill. App. 3d 406, 362 N.E.2d 9 (1977), the appellate
court reversed the trial judge's decision to reject a woman defendant's claim of
self-defense and to convict her for manslaughter. The judge had not properly applied
the state's burden of proving the absence of self-defense. The appellate court stated
that "the evidence clearly shows that the defendant, who was well aware of the
deceased's ability to inflict great bodily harm from past experience, was reasonable in
her belief that a danger of great bodily harm to herself was threatened by the
deceased.. . .Her use of deadly force was justified." Id. at 412, 362 N.E.2d at 14.
In Commonwealth v. Helm, 485 Pa. 548,402 A.2d 500 (1979), the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reversed a trial judge's finding of manslaughter on the same ground.
The court stated:
The uncontradicted evidence revealed that the stabbing occurred during an
argument in which the victim pursued appellant throughout her apartment,
beat her, knocked her down several times, choked her, and repeatedly hit
her head against the floor-all of this at a time when appellant was 6
months pregnant. At no time did appellant state that she did not think her-
self in danger of serious injury or death. Given these facts, we are unable to
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant could not have reasona-
bly believed that she was in danger of death or serious bodily injury.
76 See, e.g., State v. Jacoby, 260 N.W.2d 828 (Iowa 1977); State v. Trombino,
352 So. 2d 682 (La. 1977); State v. McMillian, 223 La. 96, 64 So. 2d 856 (1953);
People v. Stallworth, 364 Mich. 528, 111 N.W2d 742 (1961); People v. Giacalone,
242 Mich. 16, 217 N.W. 758 (1928); Wallace v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. 300, 70 S.W. 756
(1902); State v. Crigler, 23 Wash. App. 716, 598 P.2d 739 (1979).
71 See text accompanying notes 89-90 infra.
11 E.g., People v. Giacalone, 242 Mich. 16, 217 N.W. 758,760 (1928); Easterling
v. State, 267 P.2d 185, 189 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954); State v. Crigler, 23 Wash. App.
716, 598 P.2d 739, 741 (1979).
19801
638 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
its function when it is prevented from considering crucial issues in the
case."
2. Excuse Rather than Justification
Sex-bias increases the probability that the trier of fact will prefer
to excuse the woman, seeing her act as "unreasonable" self-defense. 0
Tvo strains of excuse theory have been used to excuse women acting in
self-defense. First, women have been excused for acting in the heat of
passion or under provocation. Second, women have been excused on
grounds of insanity or limited intellectual capacity.' In the past,
women charged with homicide have usually relied on these excuses;
insanity has been seen as a perfect plea for women because it empha-
sizes their mental weaknesses." These excuse defenses have had a seri-
ous impact on women because acquittal on these grounds often leads
to involuntary commitment to mental health institutions. 3
11 See Hickory v. United States, 151 U.S. 303, 313 (1893); State v. Riveira, 59
Hawaii 148, 153, 577 P.2d 793, 797 (1978).
10 "Unreasonable" self-defense is now commonly treated as manslaughter. See
People v. Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d 668, 603 P.2d 1, 160 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1979); People v.
Odum, 3 II. App. 3d 538, 279 N.E.2d 12 (1972).
", Schneider & Jordan, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves
Against Physical or SexualAssault, 4 WOMEN'S Riars L. REP. 149, 157, 159 (1978).
Note, The Battered Wife Syndrome, supra note 2, at 221; Casenote, Does Wife
Abuse Justify Homicide? supra note 2, at 1722, 1724.
8, A. JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL 158-66 (1980).
A study of 27 women convicted of murder or manslaughter showed "the ten-
dency to use a defense of mental impairment, normally diminished responsibility.
Despite circumstances that could well ground a defense of self-defense, in only one
case was self-defense argued.' Letter from Wendy Bacon and Robyn Lansdowne,
University of Sydney, Department of Social Work, February 20, 1980, to author (on
file with the Women's Self-Defense Law Project).
11 Since women are generally viewed as unreasonable even under normal cir-
cumstances, a woman trying to establish an insanity defense may be forced to prove
she was "really crazy and hysterical" before jurors will excuse her. Of course, this
defense may win the woman defendant commitment to a mental health institution.
The attitude of jurors toward the "impaired mental state" defense was shown in a
recent survey that found that 71% of those interviewed thought that "the plea of
insanity [was] a loophole allowing too many guilty men to go free.' Bronson, On the
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III. INDIVIDUALIZATION
A. The Theory
The impact of sex bias on a woman claiming self-defense can be
reduced if judge and jury consider fully the circumstances surrounding
the defendant's act and the defendant's perspective. The theory of
individualized inquiry in criminal law has been most fully developed
by George Fletcher. Individualization involves "a full consideration of
individual differences and capacities"84 when determining whether a
defendant should be held accountable for a particular crime. A defen-
dant is robbed of a fair trial when a jury cannot give her this individual
consideration. 5 Fletcher notes that both strict adherence to legal rules
that keep from the jury significant facts about the defendant's circum-
stances and the "reasonable man" standard, which is a "substitute for
inquiries about the actor's character and culpability," 6 reflect resist-
ance to individualization. 87
The argument in favor of individualization reflects a deep tension
in criminal law theory between individualized treatment and legal
rules, a tension Fletcher has characterized as the law's "distinctive anx-
iety" about individualized treatment.8 Greater individualization
within the criminal law also raises the difficult problem of whether
acknowledgement of and compensation for differences caused by dis-
crimination will perpetuate or even strengthen the very stereotyping at
the root of discrimination-a problem that has been particularly trou-
bling in the area of sex discrimination.89 However one resolves the
Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-Qualified Jury: An
Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1, 8 (1970). See gener-
ally R. SrION, THE JuRY AND THE DEFENSE OF INsANrrY (1967). For a discussion of
women who are hospitalized for psychiatric reasons, see generally P. CHESLER supra
note 27.
8, G. FLETCHER, supra note 42, at 512.
85 See text accompanying notes 50-74 supra.
86 Fletcher, Individualization, supra note 46, at 1290.
87 Id. at 1299.
11 Id. at 1293.
19 See generally Gertner, Bakke on Affirmative Action for Women: Pedestal or
Cage, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 173, 185 (1979).
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problem, it is clear that greater individualization is necessary to pro-
vide equal treatment for battered women raising self-defense claims.
Although Fletcher does not address the applicability of individu-
ality to self-defense, his theory can easily be applied to battered wom-
en's cases. Any thorough evaluation of a self-defense claim requires a
study of both the circumstances of the act and the characteristics and
perceptions of the individual defendant.
An individualized analysis of self-defense claims has been recom-
mended in some proposals and used by some courts. The Model Penal
Code, for example, looks at reasonableness from an individual's own
perspective. 0 Many jurisdictions have accepted some formulation of
this standard.9'
Without individualization, the trier of fact may be unable either
to overcome his stereotypical attitude toward the circumstances sur-
rounding the woman's act or to understand the inapplicability of tradi-
tional legal rules.9" In such situations, the judge or jury may misinter-
pret the defendant's act. When the judge or jury ignores the effects of
the sex of the defendant and tries to equate her with a man, it places a
burden on her that her male counterpart is not asked to bear. The law
can equalize the positions of male and female defendants by recogniz-
ing their differences. The attitudes of men and women toward
self-defense may differ because of internalized sex stereotypes.93 The
circumstances in which they commit homicide differ.9 These differ-
ences must be recognized as a proper basis for differentiation.
11 [T]he use of force upon or toward another person is justified when the actor
believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting him-
self against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion."
MODEL PNA. CODE § 3.04 (1) (proposed official draft 1962).
9, W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 41, at 392; 40 C.J.S. Homicide §§
124-26 (1944); 40 AM. JuR. 2d Homicide §§ 152-54 (1968). See Coleman v. State,
320 A.2d 740 (Del. 1974), in which the court held that it was reversible error to
instruct that the defendant must have had a reasonable belief that defensive force was
necessary; Delaware's new criminal code had adopted the Model Penal Code's more
individualized approach. For older cases applying an individualized standard, see
Heglin v. State, 236 Ind. 350, 140 N.E.2d 98 (1957); Eaton v. State, 200 Miss. 729, 28
So. 2d 230 (1946); Rubidaux v. State, 116 Tex. Crim. 432, 23 S.W.2d 863 (1931).
92 See text accompanying notes 50-67 supra.
91 See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
9' See text accompanying notes 67-70 supra.
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B. The Cases
Recognizing that sex bias permeates the law of self-defense, a plu-
rality of the Washington Supreme Court, in State v. Wanrow,1" explic-
itly acknowledged the need for more individualized consideration of
self-defense claims made by women. Wanrow involved the self-defense
claim of a Native American woman who shot a man she believed was
a child molester. He had entered her babysitter's home uninvited while
she and her children were there.96 The defendant was convicted of
second-degree murder.97 The trial court instructed the jury to consider
only the circumstances "at or immediately before the killing" when
evaluating the gravity of the danger the defendant faced 0 and to apply
the equal force rule.99
The Washington Supreme Court reversed Wanrow's convic-
tion.'00 Four of the eight justices ruling on the case voted to reverse on
the ground that the trial court's instructions had violated Washington
law in three ways.'0 ' First, the instruction that limited the jury's consid-
eration to circumstances "at or immediately before the killing" '02 mis-
construed Washington law. Properly construed, the state law allowed
consideration of Wanrow's knowledge of the deceased's reputation for
aggressive acts and all other prior circumstances, even if that knowl-
edge was gained long before the killing.'0 3
Second, the instruction concerning equal force misstated state law
and denied Wanrow equal protection:
95 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977) (the author was cocounsel on appeal).
For discussion of Wanrow see Comment, Battered Wives Who Kill, supra note 2;
Note, State v. Wanrow, 13 GONZAGA L. REV. 278 (1977); Note, Women's
Self-Defense Under Washington Law-State v. Wanrow, 54 WAsI. L. REv. 221
(1978).
96 88 Wash. 2d at 226, 559 P.2d at 551.
9, Id. at 224, 559 P.2d at 550.
91 Id. at 234, 559 P.2d at 555.
Id. at 239, 559 P.2d at 558.
,o Id. at 224, 559 P.2d at 550.
101 Id. at 241, 559 P.2d at 559. The conviction was reversed by a vote of five to
three on the ground that the trial court had improperly admitted a tape recording of
Wanrow's telephone conversation with the Spokane police.
101 Id. at 234, 559 P.2d at 555.
103 Id. at 236, 559 P.2d at 557.
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The impression created-that a 5 '4" woman with a cast on
her leg and using a crutch must, under the law, somehow
repel an assault by a 6'2" intoxicated man without employ-
ing weapons in her defense, unless the jury finds her deter-
mination of the degree of danger to be objectively
reasonable-constitutes a separate and distinct misstatement
of the law and, in the context of this case, violates the
respondent's right to equal protection of the law.'14
Third, the trial court erred by failing to direct the jury to consider
the reasonableness of Wanrow's act from Wanrow's perspective, "see-
ing what [s]he sees and knowing what [s]he knows.' 5 Not only did
the Supreme Court recognize the importance of the individual defen-
dant's perception, but it also understood the importance of social fac-
tors in that perception:
The respondent was entitled to have the jury consider her
actions in the light of her own perceptions of the situation,
including those perceptions which were the product of our
nation's "long and unfortunate history of sex-discrimi-
nation . . . Until such time as the effects of that history
are eradicated, care must be taken to assure that our
self-defense instructions afford women the right to have
their conduct judged in light of the individual handicaps
which are the product of sex discrimination. To fail to do so
is to deny the right of the individual woman involved to trial
by the same rules which are applicable to male defendants.'06
A number of other courts have recognized the appropriateness of
the individualized approach when battered women assert claims of
self-defense. In People v. Giacalone,'°7 for example, the Michigan
Supreme Court reversed a trial court ruling that had prevented the
defendant, a battered woman, from presenting evidence about the cir-
,0, Id. at 240, 559 P2d at 558-59.
101 Id., 559 P.2d at 557.
106 Id. at 240-41, 559 P.2d at 559.
10, 242 Mich. 16, 217 N.W. 758 (1928).
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cumstances surrounding her fatal shooting of her husband.' 8 The trial
judge had refused to admit evidence "of threats made by deceased to
defendant shortly before the shooting, of assaults made by him upon
her, of her physical injuries, and of his brutal and violent treatment of
her for some time prior to the event in question?" 09 The trial court's
exclusion of evidence was based on the absence of an overt act by the
deceased toward the defendant at the immediate time of the killing." 0
However, as the Michigan Supreme Court noted, the defendant rea-
sonably believed that the deceased's earlier threats were still in force.''
In Easterling v. State,"' the Oklahoma Criminal Court of
Appeals recognized that the particular physical attributes of an indi-
vidual defendant might justify her use of a dangerous weapon to repel
an unarmed attacker.' ' The defendant, a battered woman, had used a
pocket knife to fend off her common-law husband, after he had
grabbed her by the hair, beat her about the head, choked her, and
threatened to kill her."' While the trial court had instructed the jury
that no person has the right to use a deadly weapon to repel "a simple
assault without weapons," '115 the appellate court held that the jury
instruction had "denie[d] the accused the plea and right of
self-defense, which the evidence on her behalf tended to establish:"' 6
The appellate court said:
There may be such a difference in the size of the parties
involved or disparity in their ages or physical condition
which would give the person assaulted by fists reasonable
grounds to apprehend danger of great bodily harm and thus
legally justified in repelling the assault by the use of a deadly
weapon. It is conceivable that a man might be so brutal in
striking a woman with his fists as to cause her death."7
,01 Id. at 22, 217 N.W. at 760.
"09 Id. at 19, 217 N.W. at 759.
110 Id.
Id. at 22, 217 N.W. at 760.
,,2 267 P.2d 185 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954).
" Id. at 188.
4 Id. at 187.
115 Id.
,,6 Id. at 189.
"I Id. at 188 (emphasis added).
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Easterling suggests that a battered woman may have a particular
need for a rule of self-defense that allows a jury to compare the
deceased's and the defendant's sizes and strengths. Application of the
equal force rule without reference to the physical disparities between
an aggressor and his victim may make it almost impossible for a bat-
tered woman to prove that her use of a lethal weapon was an act of
self-defense.
Despite the individualized treatment recognized in some cases
involving battered women who have claimed self-defense, individual-
ization has neither been pervasively nor consistently incorporated into
the law of self-defense. Most courts, following traditional norms and
legal rules, have refused to recognize it; others apply it only in part."I8
Judicial modification of the "reasonable man" standard to the per-
son's own perspective and of rules governing admission of evidence of
individual circumstances has been the exception, not the rule." 9
IV USING THE INDIVIDUALIZED APPROACH
DURING TRIAL
If women are to achieve equality in court, they must be allowed
to present to juries evidence about their perspectives and about the cir-
cumstances of their acts of self-defense. The relevance of these individ-
ual perspectives and circumstances must also be incorporated into jury
instructions.
A. Admission of Evidence
The jury can understand the defendant's perceptions only if evi-
dence revealing those perceptions is admitted. Both lay and expert wit-
nesses can provide relevant evidence.
1. Lay Evidence
The defendant should be allowed to present evidence that she and
the deceased had contact before the homicide, and that the prior con-
"' See State v. McMillian, 223 La. 96, 64 So. 2d 15 (1953).
Fletcher, Individualization, supra note 46, at 1299.
[Vol. 15
Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense
tact influenced her evaluation of the situation at the time of the killing.
Evidence of threats or earlier acts of violence by the deceased and of
his reputation for violence is crucial to the jury's understanding of the
circumstances of the act and the defendant's perceptions.
Such evidence has been admitted by some courts. In Cook v.
Gisler,'2° for instance, the Washington Supreme Court said that a
woman's past experiences with her husband should be considered by
the trier of fact.' The Washington Court of Appeals suggested in
another case that a battered woman claiming self-defense in a homi-
cide trial was denied due process when she was prevented from placing
before the jury evidence of "all the surrounding circumstances which
had occurred during the several months preceding the slaying." 22
2. Expert Testimony
Expert testimony has sometimes been useful in helping jurors
understand the circumstances of the act. An expert may also be able to
focus the attention of the trier of fact on its own sex-biased attitudes
by answering unarticulated questions about whether the woman pro-
voked the violence and why she submitted to beatings. Experts can tes-
tify about characteristics of battered women in general or about the
make-up of the individual battered woman defendant. The expert in
State v. Hutto'23 was a psychologist who could testify about both.
In State v. Thomas, '2  the Ohio Court of Appeals held erroneous
the trial court's refusal to admit the testimony of the defendant's
expert witness:
Where a woman charged with murder of her spouse presents
evidence of an ongoing battering situation and asserts
self-defense as justification for the homicide (in the absence
of expert testimony on the unique psychological state of the
battered woman) a jury would be unable to properly con-
"°' 20 Wash. 2d 677, 582 P.2d 550 (1978) (action to quiet title to a home owned
by the deceased and his wife, who claimed she had shot him in self-defense).
121 Id.
122 State v. Crigler, 23 Wash. App. 716, 719, 598 P.2d 739, 741 (1979).
123 No. 79-GS-10-453 (Charleston County Ct. of Gen. Sess., S.C. Apr. 20,
1979).
"' No. 37171 (Cuyahoga County Ct. of C.P., Ohio June 20, 1978).
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sider the self defense claim, since it would not have a suffi-
cient comprehension of the defendant's state of mind at the
time of the homicide. Expert testimony in such a case is criti-
cal to an understanding of the defendant's state of mind at
the time she committed the homicide and as to the reason-
ableness of her act. 125
In Ibn-Tamas v. United States' 6 the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals remanded a murder case because the trial court had failed
to state an appropriate ground for excluding expert testimony.' 27 The
trial court had been concerned that the expert witness, a clinical psy-
chologist, would invade the province of the jury by speaking to the
ultimate issue of whether the defendant reasonably believed she was in
danger when she committed the homicide or by addressing "matters
which 'the jury itself is just as competent' to consider."' 28 The appellate
court stated that the witness would have supplied background infor-
mation and an interpretation of the facts different from the lay inter-
pretation presented by the prosecution. 29
Despite the recognition in Ibn-Tamas and Thomas of the value of
expert testimony dealing with battered women in general, expert testi-
mony not clearly tied to the individual woman defendant's circum-
stances and perspective should be used with care. Such testimony may
suggest to the trier of fact that there is a "battered woman's syndrome"
defense, which could encourage sexual stereotyping. Thus, the use of
expert witnesses is often prudently foregone, especially where the
defendant is credible and articulate.1 30
B. Jury Instructions
Jury instructions must focus the jury's attention both on the
woman defendant's circumstances and on her perspective. Some
"I9 Id. (slip opinion at 23).
126 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. App. 1979).
27 Id. at 632-40.
12a Id. at 632.
I29 d. at 632-34.
130 E.g., State v. Childers, No. S78-69 (Benton Cir. Ct., Ind. Dec. 14, 1978);
State v. Gibbs, No. 969-77 (Middlesex Cir. Ct., N.J. May 17, 1979). In both cases
attorneys with the Women's Self-Defense Law Project decided not to use expert testi-
mony because they believed that the juries would react negatively to experts and
because the women were strong witnesses.
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instructions have focused juror attention on past circumstances that
affected the woman's appraisal of the imminence of danger.' Instruc-
tions have also directed the jury to consider not only size and strength
differences between the woman and her assailant but also differences
in socialization and access to training.'3 2
In other cases, courts have instructed juries to consider women
defendants' perspectives in evaluating self-defense claims. In State v.
Allan,'33 the court instructed the jury to use as a standard what the
woman of ordinary intelligence and prudence would have done in the
circumstances faced by the defendant at the time of the alleged
offense. Instructions that direct the jury to consider the imminence of
harm as it appears to the woman have also been given.
CONCLUSION
Sex bias in the law of self-defense prevents battered women
asserting self-defense claims from receiving full and fair consideration
by juries. The male assumptions contained in legal doctrine and the
manifestation of those assumptions in court rulings on exclusion of
evidence and jury instructions deny to women an opportunity equal to
that of male defendants to present their claims of self-defense. A more
individualized approach, which permits consideration by the trier of
fact of the particular circumstances and perceptions under which a
battered woman kills her assailant, will correct the sex bias in the law
that disadvantages such women defendants.
3I See, e.g., Jury Instructions in State v. Lemons, No. 78 CR 8654 (Rodingham
Super. Ct., N.C. June 7, 1979); State v. Tallini, Crim. No. 78-5722 (Middlesex
County Super. Ct., Mass. Mar. 30, 1979).
,32 See jury instructions in cases cited at note 131 supra.
Nos. 77-4381 & 77-4382 (Middlesex County Super. Ct., Mass. Mar. 9, 1978).
114 A jury instruction in State v. Lemons, No. 78 CR 8654 (Rodingham County
Super. Ct., N.C. June 7, 1979), directed the jury to consider whether
the circumstances as they appeared to Carole Lemons at the time were suf-
ficient to create the belief in her mind that she was about to suffer death or
great bodily harm. The necessity of taking the actions the defendant took
may be either real or apparently necessary to her. It is for you the jury to
put yourselves in place of the defendant, in order to see the point of view
which he had at the time of the tragedy and view the conduct of the
deceased Roger Lemons, with all its pertinent sidelights as Carole Lemons
was warranted in viewing them.
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